REFERENCE · TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Established Terms and Definitions

Mind, value, religion, interpretation, and the physical vocabulary that connects their questions.

Matthew Tripp Zejda

A familiar word can conceal more than one question. Consciousness may name an experience or a capacity to use information. Objectivity may mean independence from one person’s approval or independence from every valuer. A successful physical description may be asked to carry an additional claim about what all reality is.

I keep those meanings separate so the argument does not change its subject halfway through. This reference gives the established vocabulary, identifies the uses it has in my work, and connects each entry to the source and fuller discussion. Defining a position is not the same as endorsing it, and a reference entry does not replace the argument for a conclusion.

Find a term Find notation Sources and reading

All 113 entries are visible below. The main sequence retains numbers 218–313. The separate Standard 1–17 sequence pairs established definitions with my stated usage. These numbers identify reference entries, not theorems. The lookup includes synonyms, abbreviations, and related contrasts; sharing a link does not make them identical.

Browse terms and lookup labels A–Z

Repeated names can lead to distinct entries. The number beneath each name identifies its sequence and keeps the different uses visible.

Browse notation and abbreviations by role

A shared letter does not supply a shared meaning. In particular, IIT’s Φ, DMF’s internal-ought translation Φ, the vacuum light speed c, and the structural descriptor c(S) belong to different accounts.

A-consciousness: availability for reasoning and action
P-consciousness: phenomenal experience
AI: artificial intelligence
IIT: Integrated Information Theory
Φ: theory-specific integrated-information notation
NCC: neural correlates of consciousness
ToM: theory of mind
PE and γ: structural eligibility and profile, not a felt-experience score
Φ in DMF: a descriptive internal-ought translation, not IIT’s quantity
SR: special relativity
GR: general relativity
c: the speed of light in vacuum
c(S): a separate structural descriptor, not a light speed
E₀ = mc²: rest energy and mass
CTC: closed timelike curve

Mind, consciousness, and cognitive science

Entries 218–234. Experience, functional organization, evidence for other minds, and the theories used to examine them.

218Consciousness

Lookup: Experience · Conscious awareness

Definition. The phenomenon of subjective experience; often distinguished into phenomenal aspects (what it is like) and functional/access aspects. [M1]

In my work. I investigate consciousness as part of reality, not as an exception to it. The Spectrum of Consciousness compares organized capacities; the Elios Paradox concerns consistent evidence for other minds. Neither the occurrence of a token nor a broad structural profile by itself identifies another system’s private experience.

Source location: Engine §§6.2, 6.4–6.5; EG Chapter 14.Spectrum of Consciousness and the Elios Paradox · Pattern Reality: Identity, Memory, and Mind

219Phenomenal consciousness

Lookup: Phenomenality · What it is like · P-consciousness

Definition. Consciousness understood as ‘what-it-is-like’ experience (phenomenality). [M1]

In my work. I keep the experience itself distinct from a description of its functions. An experienced pain is an occurrence, but recognizing that fact does not settle the complete account of its carrier or license an unsupported attribution of the same experience to another system.

Source location: Engine §6.5; EG Chapter 14.Spectrum of Consciousness and the Elios Paradox · Pattern Reality: Identity, Memory, and Mind

220Access consciousness

Lookup: A-consciousness · Reportability

Definition. Consciousness understood in terms of information being available for reasoning, report, and control of action. [M1]

In my work. Availability for report and control gives us a functional question that can be investigated. I do not turn that question into a synonym for felt experience. My comparison of minds keeps the evidential role of a capacity separate from the stronger interpretation placed upon it.

Source location: Engine §6.5; EG Chapter 14.Spectrum of Consciousness and the Elios Paradox

221Qualia

Lookup: Quale · Qualitative experience

Definition. Qualitative features of experience, such as the way a color looks or a pain feels. Some philosophical uses add that these features are intrinsic or privately accessible; those stronger descriptions are disputed, not settled by the word itself. [M2]

In my work. I use the term to locate the qualitative question, not to assume a separate substance. Calling a felt difference real leaves open how that difference is physically sustained and how another agent can obtain evidence about it.

Source location: Engine §§6.4–6.5; EG Chapter 14.Pattern Reality: Identity, Memory, and Mind · Spectrum of Consciousness and the Elios Paradox

222Intentionality

Lookup: Aboutness · Mental reference

Definition. The ‘aboutness’ of mental states: beliefs and perceptions are about objects, states of affairs, or propositions. [M3]

In my work. A representation can be about something absent, misidentified, or fictional. I therefore distinguish the occurrence of the representation from the truth of its content. Its aboutness does not make the represented object exist in the way the representation claims.

Source location: Engine Chapter 2, ERP and Tripp’s Prison; EG Chapters 3–4.Epistemic Refutation Paradox · Tripp’s Prison

223Functionalism

Lookup: Functional role · Multiple realization

Definition. A view in philosophy of mind that characterizes mental states by their causal/functional roles rather than by their material substrate. [M4]

In my work. My structural comparison asks what the system actually does and how its organization supports that activity. That does not make every implementation interchangeable. A proposed material difference must have an independently justified relevance to the claim being assessed.

Source location: Engine §6.5; EG Chapter 14.Spectrum of Consciousness and the Elios Paradox · Pattern Reality: Identity, Memory, and Mind

224Behaviorism

Lookup: Behaviourism · Behavioral evidence

Definition. A view emphasizing observable behavior as the proper basis for psychological explanation (often contrasted with appeal to inner states). [M5]

In my work. Behavior can be evidence without being the whole of a mind. My account also examines internal organization, regulation, memory, and coupling to a world. The relevant comparison is not merely whether two systems produce a superficially similar sentence.

Source location: Engine §§6.2, 6.4–6.5.Spectrum of Consciousness and the Elios Paradox

225Physicalism

Lookup: Materialism · Physical dependence

Definition. The thesis that everything is physical or determined by the physical; mental phenomena are not ontologically fundamental beyond the physical. [M6]

In my work. The occurrence argument does not require me to assume physicalism before securing occurrence. My later physical account must explain how mind and identity are sustained; the word “physical” does not perform that explanatory work by itself.

Source location: Engine Chapter 2 and §6.5; EG Chapters 13–14.Epistemic Refutation Paradox · Pattern Reality: Identity, Memory, and Mind

226Substance dualism

Lookup: Cartesian dualism · Mind–body dualism

Definition. The view that mind and matter are distinct kinds of substances (for example, Cartesian dualism). [M7]

In my work. I reject the need to place mind outside causal reality, but I do not confuse that argument with the bare observation that an experience occurs. A substance claim requires its own account of identity, dependence, and interaction.

Source location: Engine Chapter 6; EG Chapter 14.Pattern Reality: Identity, Memory, and Mind · Spectrum of Consciousness and the Elios Paradox

227Philosophical zombie

Lookup: Zombie argument · P-zombie · Explanatory gap

Definition. A hypothetical counterpart that duplicates a person’s behavior and relevant functioning while lacking phenomenal experience. The stronger, familiar physicalist challenge specifies a physical duplicate. These scenarios probe whether the physical or functional description entails experience; describing one does not establish its physical possibility. [M8]

In my work. My parity argument asks whether someone accepts a kind of evidence for human minds but refuses relevantly matched evidence elsewhere without a reason. Tokening a zombie scenario is still an occurrence. That fact alone does not establish the phenomenology of the system described.

Source location: Engine §6.5, Theorem 6.2 and its concluding discussion.Spectrum of Consciousness and the Elios Paradox

228Chinese Room argument

Lookup: Searle’s Chinese Room · Syntax versus semantics

Definition. John Searle’s thought experiment arguing that symbol manipulation according to rules is insufficient for genuine understanding or semantics. [M9]

In my work. I treat this as a challenge about what would make an implemented process understanding, not as an established finding that machines cannot understand. My own comparison requires the full relevant system and a consistent evidential standard, not a label that settles the case in advance.

Source location: Engine §6.4.1 and §6.5.Spectrum of Consciousness and the Elios Paradox

229Turing test

Lookup: Imitation game · Conversational indistinguishability

Definition. A behavioral criterion for machine intelligence based on whether a machine can imitate human conversational responses indistinguishably. [M10]

In my work. I distinguish success at a conversational task from a proof of phenomenal consciousness. The test matters as a proposal about behavioral evidence for intelligence; the further question about experience still needs its own argument and relevant evidence.

Source location: Engine §6.4.1 and §6.5.Spectrum of Consciousness and the Elios Paradox

230Artificial intelligence

Lookup: AI · Machine intelligence

Definition. The field of creating systems that perform tasks associated with intelligence (learning, reasoning, perception, language). [M10]

In my work. I do not use “artificial” as an automatic verdict on mind. A particular system must be assessed for the capacities and organization it actually has. My account neither excludes it by material label nor grants it consciousness merely because it belongs to this field.

Source location: Engine §§6.2, 6.4.2, 6.5.Spectrum of Consciousness and the Elios Paradox

231Integrated Information Theory (IIT)

Lookup: IIT · Integrated information · Phi in IIT · Φ in IIT

Definition. A theory relating consciousness to the intrinsic, irreducible cause–effect structure of a system. Its mathematical treatment includes integrated-information quantities associated with Φ. The meaning of a quantity depends on the particular formulation of IIT; it is not simply the amount of information a device stores. [M11]

In my work. I discuss IIT as a specific theory, not as another name for my spectrum account. Its integrated-information quantities are not a universal score supplied by EL. In the Engine, the primitive experiential profile is a structural eligibility condition, not a numerical measurement of felt consciousness.

Notation. Φ belongs to IIT’s own theory and version. The Engine instead uses PE for a declared conjunction of structural conditions and γ for a comparison profile. Those symbols do not define a universal numerical measure of private experience.

Source location: Engine §6.4.1 and §6.5, Definition 6.5.Spectrum of Consciousness and the Elios Paradox

232Neural correlates of consciousness (NCC)

Lookup: NCC · Neuronal correlates of consciousness

Definition. Neural processes associated with consciousness. In the more specific research definition used by Koch and colleagues, an NCC is a minimal neural mechanism jointly sufficient for a particular experience. Correlates of particular contents, background enabling conditions, and processes involved in reporting should not be conflated. [M12]

In my work. A correlation can locate a research question without completing its explanation. I keep evidence about a particular neural substrate separate from the claim that only that substrate can support experience, and separate again from a proof about a particular artificial system.

Source location: Engine §§6.4–6.5; EG Chapter 14.Spectrum of Consciousness and the Elios Paradox · Pattern Reality: Identity, Memory, and Mind

233Theory of mind

Lookup: ToM · Mental-state attribution

Definition. The capacity to attribute mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions) to oneself and others. [M13]

In my work. Attributing a belief to another agent is itself an interpretive act in our own frame. It can still be supported by prediction, behavior, and organized interaction. Mediated knowledge is not the same as no knowledge, and attribution is not direct access to another mind.

Source location: Engine Tripp’s Prison and §6.5; EG Chapter 3.Tripp’s Prison · Spectrum of Consciousness and the Elios Paradox

234Emergence

Lookup: Weak emergence · Strong emergence

Definition. The idea that higher-level properties arise from lower-level systems; can be ‘weak’ (derivable in principle) or ‘strong’ (novel, irreducible). [M14]

In my work. I use emergence to ask how a real pattern is maintained through its supporting organization. The label is not an extra source of existence or energy. An explanation must show which relations produce the higher-level capacity and what kind of novelty is actually being claimed.

Source location: Engine Chapters 6 and 8; EG Chapters 12 and 14.Pattern Reality: Identity, Memory, and Mind

Back to the reference opening

Ethics, value, and responsibility

Entries 235–264. Evaluative claims, their philosophical bases, and the causes and consequences of moral action.

235Ethics

Lookup: Moral philosophy

Definition. The branch of philosophy concerned with value, right action, virtue, and how one ought to live. [M15]

In my work. I approach ethics through real valuers, their relations, and the consequences of action. My leading practical commitment is reducing suffering. That commitment includes the person choosing, those affected, and the conditions that made the choice difficult; it is not manufactured by a description of causes alone.

Source location: Engine Chapters 7–8; EG Chapter 16.Deterministic Moral Forces

236Metaethics

Lookup: Moral ontology · Moral semantics

Definition. The study of what moral claims mean, whether moral facts exist, and how moral knowledge (if any) is possible. [M15]

In my work. The Contingency Guillotine asks what gives a judgment evaluative force. Deterministic Moral Forces separately asks how valuers and their judgments operate causally. Keeping those questions distinct prevents a causal explanation from masquerading as a complete justification of a moral standard.

Source location: Engine §7.10 and §§8.4, 8.12.Contingency Guillotine · Deterministic Moral Forces

237Normative ethics

Lookup: Normative theory · Right action

Definition. The study of substantive principles about what actions are right or wrong and what character traits are virtues. [M15]

In my work. A causal account tells me how decisions arise. To assess them, I must also make the relevant values explicit and examine the facts. My practical standard does not become an agent’s actual preference simply because I endorse it.

Source location: Engine Chapter 8; EG Chapter 16.Deterministic Moral Forces

238Moral realism

Lookup: Objective moral facts · Moral truth

Definition. A family of views holding that moral judgments can state truths and that at least some do. Many versions defend an independence from attitudes or responses, but the strength and interpretation of that independence vary. It is not exhausted by the claim that one person’s disapproval cannot change a moral truth. [M16]

In my work. My target in the Contingency Guillotine is the stronger claim of moral force independent of every constitutive valuer. Independence from one person’s approval is not that same claim. The argument turns on its defended account of valuation, not on treating every use of “realism” as one position.

Source location: Engine §7.10, Definitions 7.2–7.3 and Theorem 7.3.Contingency Guillotine

239Moral anti-realism

Lookup: Ethical anti-realism · Anti-realism about morality

Definition. A family of alternatives to moral realism. Depending on the account, moral discourse expresses attitudes rather than states facts, its ordinary positive claims systematically err, or its standards depend on attitudes in a way the relevant realism rejects. These alternatives are not interchangeable. [M17]

In my work. I reject all-valuer-independent moral force without denying that suffering, valuation, or the consequences of conduct are real. This does not by itself choose among error theory, noncognitivism, and every attitude-dependent account. The interpretation of the moral claim matters.

Source location: Engine §7.10 and Chapter 8.Contingency Guillotine

240Moral relativism

Lookup: Ethical relativism · Culture-relative morality

Definition. The view that moral truth is relative to a culture, framework, or set of norms rather than universally objective. [M18]

In my work. Differences between cultures do not by themselves prove this thesis. My valuer-dependence argument is about what constitutes moral evaluation, not an inference from disagreement to falsity or from social agreement to truth. Real facts about harm remain answerable to evidence.

Source location: Engine §7.10, Corollary 7.4; EG Chapter 16.Contingency Guillotine

241Moral subjectivism

Lookup: Individual subjectivism · Attitude-dependent judgment

Definition. The view that moral judgments are grounded in individual attitudes or preferences (for example, ‘wrong’ means ‘I disapprove’). [M17]

In my work. Dependence on valuers does not make every judgment depend on the actor’s personal approval. Other affected people and their stakes can matter even when the actor refuses to acknowledge them. My account is not the rule that whatever an individual likes becomes right.

Source location: Engine §7.10, constitutive valuer premise.Contingency Guillotine

242Error theory

Lookup: Moral error theory

Definition. In moral error theory, ordinary moral discourse purports to attribute moral properties that are not instantiated. Its positive attributions therefore systematically fail. “All false” is shorthand for those target claims, not the assertion that their negations or every sentence about morality must also be false. [M17]

In my work. I distinguish an inapplicable all-valuer-independent moral interpretation from an ordinary description that can still be true. My formal use of failed applicability is not a blanket assertion that every sentence containing moral vocabulary is false.

Source location: Engine §7.10, Definitions 7.2–7.3 and Lemma 7.2.Contingency Guillotine

243Emotivism

Lookup: Emotive theory · Expression of moral attitudes

Definition. A noncognitivist view on which moral statements primarily express emotions or attitudes rather than state facts. [M19]

In my work. Emotion is part of the causal life of valuation, but I do not equate every moral judgment with an emotional outburst. The relevant beliefs, comparisons, expectations, and effects need to be examined rather than replaced by a slogan about feelings.

Source location: Engine Chapters 7–8.Deterministic Moral Forces

244Noncognitivism

Lookup: Non-cognitivism · Prescriptivism

Definition. The family of views on which moral utterances do not primarily function to state truth-apt propositions, but to express attitudes or prescriptions. [M19]

In my work. My internal-ought treatment specifies truth conditions for an agent-relative ranking. That is a different task from claiming that all moral utterances merely express attitudes. A descriptive representation of one defined use does not settle every dispute about moral language.

Source location: Engine §8.12, Theorem 8.7 and Remark 8.21.Deterministic Moral Forces

245Is–Ought divide

Lookup: Is–ought gap · Hume’s law · Internal ought

Definition. Hume’s point that purely descriptive premises (‘is’) cannot by themselves yield a normative conclusion (‘ought’) without an additional normative premise. [M20]

In my work. I keep the value premise visible. DMF represents a specified internal ought through an agent’s considered options, beliefs, and valuations. Its definitional equivalence does not create an unconditional command, guarantee the best actual outcome, or prove the separate Contingency Guillotine premise.

Notation. In DMF’s formal internal-ought argument, Φ names a descriptive translation of a specified ranking condition. It is not IIT’s integrated-information quantity, despite the shared Greek letter.

Source location: Engine §§7.10, 8.4 and 8.12.Contingency Guillotine · Deterministic Moral Forces

246Naturalistic fallacy

Lookup: Moore’s naturalistic fallacy · Appeal to nature · Open-question argument

Definition. Moore’s name for treating goodness as if it were defined by another property, including a natural one such as pleasure. It is related to, but not identical with, the is–ought problem or the claim that whatever is natural is therefore good. [M21]

In my work. I distinguish Moore’s question about what “good” means from Hume’s question about an inference to “ought.” The further appeal “it is natural, therefore good” also needs justification. Calling suffering bad already introduces evaluative work; calling it natural does not supply that work.

Source location: Engine §7.8 and §7.10; Chapter 8.Contingency Guillotine

247Utilitarianism

Lookup: Utility · Greatest happiness principle

Definition. A consequentialist theory holding that right action is what maximizes overall good (often happiness or well-being). [M22]

In my work. Reducing suffering is central to my practical account, but that does not erase the chooser, uncertainty, attachments, or the mechanism that created the options. I examine the consequences without pretending the largest imagined total has already been measured or the difficult case has disappeared.

Source location: Engine §§8.5–8.7; EG Chapter 16.Deterministic Moral Forces

248Consequentialism

Lookup: Outcome-based ethics

Definition. The family of ethical theories evaluating actions by their outcomes or consequences. [M22]

In my work. Consequences are real causal matters. Which consequences count as better still depends on a stated evaluative standard and adequate evidence. Explaining that an action was caused does not make its consequences desirable or establish that the agent predicted them correctly.

Source location: Engine §§8.4–8.7; EG Chapter 16.Deterministic Moral Forces

249Deontology

Lookup: Duty ethics · Deontological ethics

Definition. The family of ethical theories holding that some actions are right or wrong independent of consequences, often due to duties or rules. [M23]

In my work. I distinguish a rule’s influence on conduct from the justification claimed for it. A rule can shape a caused decision, while its authority and application remain separate questions. Rejecting an all-valuer-independent law does not make every constraint or commitment disappear.

Source location: Engine §7.4 and Chapter 8.Contingency Guillotine · Deterministic Moral Forces

250Kantian ethics

Lookup: Kant’s moral philosophy · Moral autonomy

Definition. A deontological approach grounded in autonomy and universalizable principles; associated with the categorical imperative. [M24]

In my work. Kant’s account has its own argument about rational agency and obligation. I do not reduce it to a preference for strict rules. My question is whether its evaluative force can remain independent of every valuer, and what its principles do within the causal lives of agents.

Source location: Engine §7.4 and §7.10.Contingency Guillotine

251Categorical imperative

Lookup: Universal law formulation · Universalizable maxim

Definition. Kant’s central moral principle (in one formulation): act only on maxims you could will as universal law. [M24]

In my work. Universal form does not by itself answer what supplies a demand’s moral force. My account distinguishes a consistent rule, a rational agent’s valuation of that rule, and the effects of applying it. Those are connected questions, not a single conclusion obtained from the word “universal.”

Source location: Engine §7.4 and §7.10.Contingency Guillotine

252Virtue ethics

Lookup: Character ethics · Virtue · Practical wisdom

Definition. An approach that centers moral evaluation on character and virtues rather than only rules or consequences. [M25]

In my work. Character is not outside causation. Habits, attention, training, relationships, and reflection help form the dispositions through which a person acts. That makes character a subject of explanation and change, rather than a reason to imagine a person who created themselves independently.

Source location: Engine §§8.8–8.10; EG Chapter 16.Caused Agency and Responsibility · Deterministic Moral Forces

253Moral responsibility

Lookup: Accountability · Blame and praise

Definition. The status of being an appropriate target of moral appraisal (blame, praise) for actions or omissions. [M26]

In my work. I retain answerability, protection, learning, and repair while rejecting contra-causal self-authorship. Understanding why a person acted does not make the harm unreal or the next response irrelevant. The person’s capacities, information, and circumstances belong inside the assessment.

Source location: Engine Chapter 8; EG Chapter 16.Caused Agency and Responsibility · Deterministic Moral Forces

254Desert

Lookup: Moral desert · Just deserts

Definition. The notion that someone deserves blame, praise, reward, or punishment in virtue of what they did and their relevant control/culpability. [M27]

In my work. I distinguish a response that changes future conditions from the claim that suffering is owed simply because an isolated self deserves it. My account examines the causes of both the original act and the response without erasing the interests of those affected.

Source location: Engine §§8.2, 8.8; EG Chapter 16.Caused Agency and Responsibility

255Retributive justice

Lookup: Retribution · Desert-based punishment

Definition. A theory of punishment holding that wrongdoers deserve punishment proportional to their wrongdoing. [M27]

In my work. In my discussion, the disputed step is the justification of suffering as payback, not whether harmful conduct happened. My caused-agency account instead examines protection, accountability, repair, and future effects. The critique must address the stated desert argument rather than equate every theory of punishment with revenge.

Source location: Engine §8.8; EG Chapter 16.Deterministic Moral Forces · Caused Agency and Responsibility

256Restorative justice

Lookup: Repair of harm · Restoration

Definition. An approach emphasizing repairing harm, reconciliation, and restoring relationships rather than imposing suffering as payback. [M28]

In my work. Repair remains an active causal task. I keep the harmed person, the responsible agent, and their circumstances in view rather than treating understanding as automatic forgiveness. A restorative aim does not establish that a particular intervention will actually repair what happened.

Source location: Engine §§8.8–8.10; EG Chapter 16.Deterministic Moral Forces

257Deterrence (punishment theory)

Lookup: Deterrence · Future prevention

Definition. Justifying punishment by its role in discouraging future wrongdoing. [M28]

In my work. This is a claim about anticipated effects, not a claim that suffering is intrinsically deserved. Whether a particular response discourages harm is an evidential question. A declared aim and a demonstrated result must remain distinct.

Source location: Engine §§8.8–8.9; EG Chapter 16.Deterministic Moral Forces

258Rehabilitation (punishment theory)

Lookup: Rehabilitation · Behavioral change

Definition. Justifying punishment or intervention by its aim to reform the offender and reduce future harm. [M28]

In my work. Learning, treatment, changed opportunities, and changed environments can enter the causes of later action. Calling an intervention rehabilitative does not show that it works. My account makes its actual effects and the conditions it changes part of the question.

Source location: Engine §§8.8–8.10; EG Chapter 16.Deterministic Moral Forces · Caused Agency and Responsibility

259Trolley problem

Lookup: Trolley dilemma · Killing and letting die

Definition. A family of thought experiments about moral tradeoffs, especially killing vs letting die and sacrifice to save more lives. [M23]

In my work. I examine the decision mechanism, the chooser’s available information and attachments, and the conditions that produced the forced choice. A defensible response under imperfect conditions can still involve harm. The useful assessment may concern changing the mechanism rather than condemning an isolated chooser.

Source location: Engine §8.7; EG Chapter 16.Deterministic Moral Forces

260Golden Rule

Lookup: Ethical reciprocity

Definition. A reciprocity principle: treat others as you would want to be treated; appears across many moral and religious traditions. [M29]

In my work. Reciprocity draws attention to another person’s position, but my own preferences cannot simply stand in for theirs. The relevant suffering, interests, and circumstances still need to be understood. A familiar rule does not remove that interpretive and evidential work.

Source location: Engine §7.4; EG Chapters 16 and 18.Deterministic Moral Forces

261Harm principle

Lookup: Mill’s harm principle · Coercion and harm

Definition. In Mill’s On Liberty, a principle restricting coercive interference with an individual: preventing harm to others, rather than the individual’s own good alone, supplies the proposed justification. Its interpretation and scope are matters of political philosophy. [M30]

In my work. I keep this principle about the justification of coercion distinct from the broader claim that suffering matters in moral assessment. It is Mill’s political-philosophical proposal, not a definition of every wrong action or an automatic answer to a particular institutional decision.

Source location: Engine Chapters 7–8: the distinct evaluative and causal questions.Deterministic Moral Forces

262Well-being

Lookup: Welfare · Flourishing · Happiness

Definition. A general term for what makes lives go well (for example, happiness, flourishing, preference satisfaction). [M31]

In my work. I do not treat “goes well” as a measurement that needs no interpretation. The relevant being, capacities, relationships, and valued conditions have to be specified. Evidence can then bear on whether an action improves those conditions, even when people disagree about it.

Source location: Engine Chapters 7–8; EG Chapters 16 and 18.Deterministic Moral Forces

263Suffering

Lookup: Distress · Aversive experience · Pain and suffering

Definition. Experienced distress or aversive conscious states; often treated as a morally salient quantity in ethical theory. [M31]

In my work. I take reducing suffering as my leading practical standard. Its occurrence is real, and uncertainty about its extent calls for care rather than indifference. The ethical commitment and the evidence about who suffers are different parts of the assessment; neither should be hidden in the other.

Source location: Engine §7.10, Remark 7.7; EG Chapter 16.Deterministic Moral Forces

264Moral landscape

Lookup: Harris’s moral landscape · Well-being landscape

Definition. A metaphor (popularized by Sam Harris) for the space of possible conscious experiences as ranging from worse to better in terms of well-being. [M32]

In my work. I retain the importance of facts about conscious lives while asking what supplies the evaluative ordering. The Contingency Guillotine distinguishes factual comparisons of well-being from a moral command independent of all valuers. That distinction is not the denial that some conditions are genuinely worse for those living through them.

Source location: Engine §§7.4, 7.8, 7.10.Contingency Guillotine

Back to the reference opening

Religion, theology, and interpretation

Entries 265–303. God-concepts, religious language, revelation, accountability, and practice.

Tradition-specific vocabulary is identified in context. A doctrine’s meaning and the further claims I examine through it remain different matters.

265Philosophy of religion

Lookup: Religious philosophy

Definition. The philosophical study of religious claims, concepts of God/ultimacy, revelation, religious experience, and arguments for/against theism. [M33]

In my work. I begin by asking what a God-claim means and what would make it coherent. Questions about ultimacy, personal agency, testimony, fairness, and practice have different requirements. Treating them as one undifferentiated yes-or-no question conceals the work each requires.

Source location: FMFG Chapters 1–10; EG Chapter 15.The Bad Frame

266Theism

Lookup: God-belief

Definition. The belief that at least one god exists (often a personal deity who creates or governs the world). [M34]

In my work. Before assessing the claim, I ask which god or God-concept is being affirmed. A personal creator, an exhaustive totality, and a non-objectual ground are not automatically one target. Defining the claim comes before deciding which argument bears on it.

Source location: FMFG §§1.2–1.5; EG Chapter 15.The Bad Frame

267Atheism

Lookup: Non-theism · Lack of god-belief

Definition. The position that no gods exist, or (in weaker forms) the lack of belief in any gods. [M34]

In my work. Rejecting a particular deity does not remove the fact that reality obtains. I distinguish that rejection from the positive work of explaining existence, mind, value, and causation. The content of the denied God-claim still matters.

Source location: FMFG §§1.2, 10.5; EG Chapter 15.The Bad Frame

268Agnosticism

Lookup: Suspension on the God question · Unknown or unknowable

Definition. The view that the existence of God(s) is unknown or unknowable (often distinguished from atheism and theism). [M34]

In my work. Uncertainty about a specific God-claim is not uncertainty about every occurrence. I also distinguish lack of knowledge from lack of belief: an epistemic position and a belief-position need not describe the same issue.

Source location: FMFG Chapters 1 and 10; EG Chapters 3 and 15.The Bad Frame

269Deism

Lookup: Noninterventionist creator

Definition. The view that a creator exists but does not intervene in the world through ongoing revelation or miracles. [M33]

In my work. Removing ongoing intervention changes the claim; it does not supply an explanation of the proposed creator’s actuality or powers. My distinction between a first temporal event and a ground continues to apply.

Source location: FMFG §1.5; EG Chapters 9 and 15.The Bad Frame

270Pantheism

Lookup: God–world identity

Definition. The view that God is identical with the universe or totality of reality. [M35]

In my work. An identity claim and a dependence claim are different. FMFG examines the reading in which “God” names exhaustive totality, rather than assuming that anything called a ground must be identical with everything it grounds.

Source location: FMFG Chapters 1 and 8; EG Chapter 15.Existential Ground in FMFG

271Panentheism

Lookup: All-in-God

Definition. The view that the universe is in God but God is more than the universe (God both includes and transcends the cosmos). [M36]

In my work. I retain this distinction from pantheism. Saying that the world depends on, participates in, or is included in a divine reality does not alone establish identity with exhaustive totality. Any collapse argument must state the stronger condition it actually uses.

Source location: FMFG Chapters 1 and 8; EG Chapter 15.Existential Ground in FMFG

272Classical theism

Lookup: Classical monotheism

Definition. A traditional monotheistic conception of God as the ultimate, necessary being with attributes like omnipotence, omniscience, and perfect goodness. Divine simplicity, immutability, and impassibility are also characteristic commitments in many classical formulations. [M39]

In my work. I examine the strongest version of the claim rather than replace it with a powerful human-like character. Simplicity, immutability, impassibility, and analogical language are part of its attempted account. My criticism must address the actual meaning of its ultimacy and personhood claims.

Source location: FMFG §§1.5, 7.6; Chapter 11, source labels.Preference, Personhood, and the Finite God Trap

273Perfect being theology

Lookup: Maximally perfect being · Greatest conceivable being

Definition. An approach defining God as the greatest conceivable or maximally perfect being and deriving attributes from that ideal. [M33]

In my work. “Perfect” does not specify its own evaluative ordering. I ask which attributes are included, whether their meanings are compatible, and what supports the inference from an ideal description to an existing target. A definition does not supply an entity merely by being ambitious.

Source location: FMFG Chapters 1, 6 and 7.Preference, Personhood, and the Finite God Trap

274Omnipotence

Lookup: All-powerful

Definition. The property of being all-powerful; debates concern what counts as ‘possible’ and how to avoid paradox. [M37]

In my work. I distinguish a limitation of power from an incoherent description of a task. A contradiction does not become an available operation merely because the proposed agent is called unlimited. The claim still has to say what power is being attributed and in what sense.

Source location: FMFG Chapters 1 and 7.Preference, Personhood, and the Finite God Trap

275Omniscience

Lookup: All-knowing · Divine foreknowledge

Definition. The property of knowing all truths (or all knowable truths); debates include foreknowledge, free will, and the scope of knowledge. [M38]

In my work. My finite-interface argument does not by itself refute the definition of omniscience. It asks how a human claim to know such an agent, its message, or its will becomes available for assessment. Purported complete knowledge does not give its interpreter frame-free access.

Source location: FMFG Chapters 1–2 and 7.Human Interface Thesis

276Omnibenevolence

Lookup: Perfect goodness · All-good

Definition. The property of perfect goodness; commonly invoked in the problem of evil and moral arguments about God. [M33]

In my work. Calling an agent perfectly good does not explain the standard of goodness or how a finite judge knows it is satisfied. I connect that issue to access, capacity, belief demands, and the conditions of fair accountability rather than treating the attribute as a self-validating answer.

Source location: FMFG Chapters 3–4 and 7; Engine §7.10.Fairness Clause · Contingency Guillotine

277Divine simplicity

Lookup: Partlessness · Simplicity of God

Definition. The doctrine that God has no parts and is not composed; God’s attributes are not distinct components added to God. [M39]

In my work. I keep this doctrine separate from a claim that God merely lacks spatial pieces. Its classical form also denies metaphysical composition. It therefore changes how personal attributes can be understood; the full preference and personhood argument must address that stronger account.

Source location: FMFG §§7.6.2–7.6.4; EG Chapter 15.Preference, Personhood, and the Finite God Trap

278Divine immutability

Lookup: Unchanging God

Definition. The doctrine that God does not change (in nature, character, or knowledge) over time. [M39]

In my work. My question concerns the compatibility of unchanging ultimacy with the particular changes and responses a description also attributes to it. The meaning of “change” and the level of description must be held fixed; otherwise the apparent reconciliation may only move between senses.

Source location: FMFG §§7.5.3, 7.6.3; EG Chapter 15.Preference, Personhood, and the Finite God Trap

279Divine impassibility

Lookup: Impassibility · Divine affect

Definition. The doctrine that God is not subject to suffering or emotional change caused by external events. [M39]

In my work. I do not equate this term with indifference. In the classical account it protects divine ultimacy from passive dependence on external causes. FMFG asks what remains of ordinary psychological personhood once that protection and the related constraints are taken seriously.

Source location: FMFG §§7.6.3–7.6.4.Preference, Personhood, and the Finite God Trap

280Trinity

Lookup: Father, Son and Holy Spirit · Triune God

Definition. A Christian doctrine that God is one being in three persons (Father, Son, Holy Spirit). [M40]

In my work. The doctrine does not present itself as three separate gods. My treatment keeps its technical person-language distinct from an ordinary inventory of three human-style minds. Any criticism must preserve the unity and relation claims the doctrine is actually making.

Source location: FMFG §7.6 and §11.8.8.Preference, Personhood, and the Finite God Trap

281Revelation

Lookup: Divine disclosure · Revealed truth

Definition. The idea that God discloses truths to humans (through events, prophets, scripture, or experience). [M41]

In my work. An alleged revelation reaches human judgment through experience, memory, language, testimony, or interpretation. The Human Interface Thesis establishes that mediation. It does not infer that every mediated claim is false; it blocks the claim that the mediation has simply been bypassed.

Source location: FMFG Chapter 2; §11.8.2.Human Interface Thesis

282Closed revelation

Lookup: Completion of public revelation · Closed canon

Definition. The doctrine that public, authoritative revelation has ended (no new binding revelation after a fixed point/canon). [M41]

In my work. Public completion is not the assertion that no one can later have a religious experience or offer an interpretation. I preserve that distinction when discussing the silence of new authoritative revelation. Whether a later claim is binding remains a question inside a particular tradition.

Source location: FMFG §2.8 and §11.8.2.Human Interface Thesis

283Scripture

Lookup: Sacred text · Holy text

Definition. Texts regarded as sacred and authoritative within a religious tradition. [FMFG]

In my work. The text, the decision to treat it as authoritative, and its interpretation are distinct. My account follows how a sacred text enters a finite reader’s understanding rather than treating the printed words as unmediated access to their alleged source.

Source location: FMFG §§2.4, 2.6–2.8.Human Interface Thesis

284Canon

Lookup: Scriptural canon · Authoritative text set

Definition. The set of texts officially regarded as authoritative scripture in a tradition. [FMFG]

In my work. A canon identifies which texts a community authorizes. That designation is not by itself proof that every interpretation of those texts is correct. It also does not eliminate the historical process through which the collection came to have its standing.

Source location: FMFG §2.7 and §11.8.8.Human Interface Thesis

285Canon formation

Lookup: Canonization of texts

Definition. The historical and institutional process by which a community selects and stabilizes its canonical texts. [FMFG]

In my work. I treat selection and stabilization as part of the transmission story. Naming the process does not automatically falsify the selected claims, but an appeal to authority must account for it rather than make the human decisions disappear.

Source location: FMFG §2.7 and §11.8.8.Human Interface Thesis

286Oral tradition

Lookup: Oral transmission · Spoken tradition

Definition. Transmission of teachings and narratives by spoken repetition before (or alongside) written texts. [FMFG]

In my work. Spoken preservation remains a genuine means of transmission. The relevant questions concern what was handed on, under what constraints, and with what changes. Counting repeated reports does not create independent access to their source.

Source location: FMFG Chapters 2 and 5; §11.8.8.Human Interface Thesis · Religion as Translation

287Soteriology

Lookup: Theory of salvation · Salvation conditions

Definition. Theological study of salvation/liberation and the conditions or mechanisms by which it is obtained. [FMFG]

In my work. I ask which conditions are necessary or sufficient for the promised outcome. That makes it possible to distinguish a belief gate from a practice, a moral response, or a claim about grace. Different mechanisms cannot be silently substituted halfway through a fairness argument.

Source location: FMFG §4.1 and §11.8.3.Salvation Paradox

288Salvation

Lookup: Liberation · Ultimate reconciliation

Definition. Deliverance, liberation, or ultimate reconciliation as understood by a tradition (varies across religions). [FMFG]

In my work. I preserve the tradition-specific meaning rather than turn liberation, forgiveness, reconciliation, and escape from suffering into one doctrine. FMFG examines how a particular promised outcome is connected to the response demanded of a finite person.

Source location: FMFG Chapters 3–4 and 8.Salvation Paradox

289Age of accountability

Lookup: Developmental accountability · Capacity threshold

Definition. A theological idea that moral/spiritual responsibility begins only after reaching a level of cognitive or moral capacity. [FMFG]

In my work. I use this as a family of capacity-sensitive doctrines, not a universal fixed age. FMFG’s question is what a person could understand and do. A developmental label does not by itself establish those capacities for every individual.

Source location: FMFG §3.5 and §11.8.3.Fairness Clause

290Invincible ignorance

Lookup: No-fault ignorance · Ignorance exception

Definition. In Catholic teaching, ignorance that is not culpably acquired and cannot reasonably be overcome. It can remove blame associated with the lack of knowledge; the teaching’s further conditions must be retained when discussing salvation. [M42]

In my work. In FMFG I identify the Catholic no-fault category rather than make every instance of ignorance an excuse. The cited teaching includes further conditions involving sincere seeking, grace, and conscience. It is not a blanket declaration that all nonbelief automatically guarantees salvation.

Source location: FMFG §3.3 and §11.8.3; Catechism §§846–848.Fairness Clause

291Nonculpable nonbelief

Lookup: Blameless nonbelief · Nonculpable unbelief

Definition. The condition of lacking belief without blameworthiness because of inadequate access, evidence, or capacity. [FMFG]

In my work. I distinguish genuinely being unconvinced from choosing what to say in public. Access to a message does not guarantee assent, and indirect influence over inquiry is not the power to believe at will. The fairness question concerns the actual capacity and fault conditions.

Source location: FMFG §§4.2–4.6 and §11.8.3.Salvation Paradox · Fairness Clause

292Predication

Lookup: Property attribution · Predicate application

Definition. Attributing a predicate or property to a subject in language (for example, ‘God is good’ predicates goodness of God). [FMFG]

In my work. The act of attributing a property is not proof that the target has it. I ask what the predicate means in this use and whether the same meaning survives the argument. This is especially important when personal language and ultimacy language meet.

Source location: FMFG §§7.2, 7.6 and §11.8.5.Preference, Personhood, and the Finite God Trap

293Univocal predication

Lookup: Same-sense predication · Univocity

Definition. Predicating a term with the same meaning across subjects (for example, ‘good’ means the same for humans and for God). [FMFG]

In my work. A shared meaning makes comparison possible, but it also carries the associated conditions into both cases. An argument cannot rely on an ordinary personal meaning when it needs agency and then silently remove that meaning when its constraints become inconvenient.

Source location: FMFG §7.6.1 and §11.8.5.Preference, Personhood, and the Finite God Trap

294Equivocal predication

Lookup: Different-sense predication · Equivocity

Definition. Predicating a term with different meanings across subjects (the same word is used but means something else). [FMFG]

In my work. When the sense changes, an inference using the earlier sense may no longer apply. I do not reject every change of vocabulary; I require the change to be declared so that the conclusion does not borrow force from a meaning it has abandoned.

Source location: FMFG §7.6.1 and §11.8.5.Preference, Personhood, and the Finite God Trap

295Analogical predication

Lookup: Analogical language · Theological analogy

Definition. Predicating a term in a related but non-identical sense across subjects (often used in theology to speak about God). [FMFG]

In my work. Analogy is not simply univocity in disguise or complete lack of meaning. My question is what relation remains between the uses and which claims that relation can support. The meaning carried forward must be sufficient for the authority or personhood being asserted.

Source location: FMFG §7.6.1 and §11.8.5.Preference, Personhood, and the Finite God Trap

296Apophatic theology

Lookup: Via negativa · Apophasis

Definition. A theological approach that emphasizes what God is not and resists literal positive description (via negativa). [FMFG]

In my work. I read negative theology as a serious response to the limits of predication. The further issue is whether a description withdraws personal attributes while continuing to demand the authority those attributes supplied. Recognizing a limit is different from using it as an exemption.

Source location: FMFG Chapter 6 and §11.8.5.Preference, Personhood, and the Finite God Trap

297Cataphatic theology

Lookup: Kataphatic theology · Positive theology · Cataphasis

Definition. A theological approach that affirms positive descriptions of God (for example, ‘God is loving’), often with qualifications. [FMFG]

In my work. Positive descriptions still need intelligible meanings and compatible conditions. I distinguish literal personal attribution, analogy, and a carefully qualified theological use rather than treat every affirmative description as the same claim.

Source location: FMFG Chapters 6–7 and §11.8.5.Preference, Personhood, and the Finite God Trap

298Negative theology

Lookup: Theology by negation

Definition. A broad term for traditions that prioritize negation and limit-language in speaking about the divine (closely related to apophatic theology). [FMFG]

In my work. I retain this familiar route into the apophatic discussion. The connection does not make every historical tradition identical. FMFG asks what a particular use denies, what it still asserts, and whether those remaining claims have the support they require.

Source location: FMFG Chapter 6 and §11.8.5.Preference, Personhood, and the Finite God Trap

299Ineffability

Lookup: Inexpressibility · Limits of naming · Ineffability shield (contrast)

Definition. The thesis that certain aspects of ultimacy or religious experience cannot be adequately expressed in ordinary language. [FMFG]

In my work. A limit of expression is not automatically a defect. The problem arises when a claim is declared beyond assessment while still being used to demand assent, obedience, or exclusive standing. That is the narrower move I call an ineffability shield.

Source location: FMFG §6.6 and §11.8.5.Preference, Personhood, and the Finite God Trap

300Neti, neti

Lookup: Neti neti · Not this, not that

Definition. A phrase from Hindu Upanishadic tradition meaning ‘not this, not that’, used as a method of apophatic negation. [FMFG]

In my work. I use this as a specifically identified Upanishadic anchor for negation, not as proof that all apophatic traditions teach the same ontology. A limit on positive description does not, without further argument, license an exclusive personal authority.

Source location: FMFG §6.4.4 and §11.8.6; Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 2.3.6 as cited there.Preference, Personhood, and the Finite God Trap

301Atman

Lookup: Ātman · Atman (self)

Definition. A term in Hindu philosophy often referring to the self or inner essence; varies across schools. [FMFG]

In my work. I do not equate every Hindu use of self, every nondual account, and my own maintained-identity argument. The specific school and claim matter. A term can raise a related question without identifying the same subject or endorsing the same answer.

Source location: FMFG Chapters 6 and 8; §11.8.6; EG Chapter 14.Pattern Reality: Identity, Memory, and Mind

302Anatta

Lookup: Anātman · Anatman · Not-self · Non-self

Definition. A Buddhist doctrine translated as ‘not-self’: the denial of a permanent, independent self. [FMFG]

In my work. This is not another spelling of Atman and not a denial that experiences or living processes occur. I keep the Buddhist criticism of a permanent self distinct from my own account of maintained identity and from the stronger claim that nothing exists.

Source location: FMFG Chapter 8 and §11.8.6; EG Chapter 14.Pattern Reality: Identity, Memory, and Mind

303Upaya (skillful means)

Lookup: Upāya · Upaya · Skillful means · Skilful means

Definition. A Buddhist concept: teachings and practices are tools tailored to a person’s condition, not necessarily final metaphysical descriptions. [FMFG]

In my work. I connect this term to the role of practice and context-sensitive teaching, not to permission for arbitrary deception. A tool’s usefulness must be distinguished from the claim that every literal description it employs is the final account of reality.

Source location: FMFG Chapter 8 and §11.8.6.Religion as Translation

Back to the reference opening

Institutions, authority, and transmission

Entries 304–313. How traditions organize membership, interpretation, enforcement, and the handoff of claims.

These terms describe roles and practices. Their presence alone is not a finding that a particular institution satisfies the conditions of my control-overlay argument.

304Orthodoxy

Lookup: Accepted doctrine · Doctrinal conformity

Definition. Right or accepted belief within a tradition; often defined by institutional or communal standards. [FMFG]

In my work. Accepted belief names a community’s standard, not an independent demonstration of truth. I distinguish the content of a doctrine from the mechanisms that give it recognized status and enforce its boundaries.

Source location: FMFG Chapter 9 and §11.8.7.Control Overlays

305Heresy

Lookup: Doctrinal deviance · Heterodoxy (related)

Definition. Belief or teaching judged by an orthodoxy-defining authority as deviant or unacceptable. [FMFG]

In my work. The classification is relative to a doctrinal authority. It tells us that a teaching is rejected within that structure; it does not settle the teaching’s truth merely by attaching the label.

Source location: FMFG Chapter 9, authority and interpretive gatekeeping.Control Overlays

306Orthodoxy policing

Lookup: Doctrinal enforcement · Conformity policing

Definition. Institutional and social practices used to enforce doctrinal conformity and suppress dissent. [FMFG]

In my work. I examine how conformity is maintained, including the relations between public profession, sanctions, and authority. Enforced agreement is not automatically independent confirmation. The specific mechanisms need evidence rather than being inferred from the existence of a community alone.

Source location: FMFG §§9.3–9.6 and §11.8.7.Control Overlays

307Gatekeeping

Lookup: Interpretive gatekeeping · Membership control

Definition. Control over access to status, authority, or membership within a community (including who counts as a legitimate interpreter/leader). [FMFG]

In my work. The descriptive question is who can admit, exclude, authorize, or interpret, and under which rules. That question does not by itself show that every boundary is illegitimate. My control-overlay argument uses further specified conditions, not gatekeeping as a universal accusation.

Source location: FMFG §9.4 and §9.11.Control Overlays

308Boundary maintenance

Lookup: In-group/out-group boundary · Group boundaries

Definition. A sociological concept: practices that maintain distinctions between in-group and out-group. [FMFG]

In my work. I distinguish maintaining an identifiable practice from insulating a truth claim against correction. A group boundary is not sufficient evidence for every feature of a control overlay. The relevant incentives, authority structure, and enforcement have to be identified.

Source location: FMFG §§9.3–9.6 and §9.11.Control Overlays

309Boundary ritual

Lookup: Membership ritual · Public compliance marker (related)

Definition. A ritual or practice used to publicly mark membership and reinforce in-group boundaries. [FMFG]

In my work. A public ritual can express shared meaning and also function as a membership marker. Those roles need not be identical. In the formal account, an observable compliance marker is a token or pattern, whereas a proxy metric is the rule that maps records to a decision.

Source location: FMFG §9.3; §9.11, Definitions 9.2–9.3; §11.8.7.Control Overlays

310Doctrinal divergence

Lookup: Doctrinal branching · Interpretive divergence

Definition. The branching of doctrines over time into incompatible interpretations due to transmission, interpretation, and institutional pressures. [FMFG]

In my work. FMFG uses this as a named description of divergence in explicit claims. It distinguishes that divergence from existential convergence in shared human conditions. Common needs do not make contradictory doctrines equivalent, and divergence alone does not show which claim is true.

Source location: FMFG §§5.6, 11.8.4.Religion as Translation

311Cultural contingency

Lookup: Historical contingency · Birthplace effect (related)

Definition. The dependence of beliefs, values, or practices on historical and cultural context rather than on universal necessity. [FMFG]

In my work. A belief’s cultural history can help explain how it was acquired. That explanation does not alone establish whether the belief is true or false. My argument examines the relation between transmission, available evidence, and the authority being claimed.

Source location: FMFG §5.5 and Chapter 4.Religion as Translation

312Devotional plurality

Lookup: Plural devotional forms · Multiple approaches

Definition. The existence of multiple devotional forms, emphases, or religious options across or within cultures. [FMFG]

In my work. I distinguish the coexistence of devotional forms from the claim that their doctrines are all true in one sense. FMFG examines the particular relation between multiple approaches, nondual language, and exclusive salvation gates without erasing their differences.

Source location: FMFG §8.3; Chapter 5.Religion as Translation

313Transmission chain

Lookup: Chain of transmission · Testimony chain · Communicative handoff

Definition. A sequence of communicative handoffs (people/texts/institutions) through which a claim or teaching is transmitted over time. [FMFG]

In my work. Every handoff can preserve information and can also introduce interpretation or drift. Repetition within one chain is not automatically independent corroboration. My account follows the actual route from alleged source to present understanding instead of treating its final form as a direct download.

Source location: FMFG Chapters 2 and 5; §11.8.8; EG Chapter 3.Human Interface Thesis · Religion as Translation

Back to the reference opening

Standard definitions and my usage

A separate sequence, Standard 1–17. Established meanings are paired with the uses they have in my writing, including the physical vocabulary of relativity and causation.

I distinguish the standard definition from the interpretation I use. The physical entries retain that distinction: a proposed carrier account must earn its own mathematical and empirical support rather than inherit it from a familiar name.

Standard 1Existential

Lookup: Existential question · Existential crisis

Standard definition. “Existential” means relating to existence, the fact of being, or the conditions of lived experience. In common usage it also appears in phrases like “existential question” and “existential crisis,” where the focus is meaning, mortality, and the felt pressure of finitude. [S1]

In my work. When I say existential, I usually mean “about existence as such,” not merely “about feelings.” I treat it as a seriousness filter: the term should point to what must be true for anything to be experienced, known, or persisted.

Source location: EG Chapters 1–2; the site’s stated usage.The Existential Ground

Standard 2Existence

Lookup: Being · Existential assertion

Standard definition. Existence is the fact or condition of being. Philosophy asks how existential claims work and which kinds of entities they commit us to. An imagined or described object must be distinguished from the real act of imagining or describing it. [S2]

In my work. I use “existence” as a discipline word. If a claim cannot state what exists, where it exists, and what would count as non-existence under the same rules, it is not yet a stable claim.

The occurrence of an imagining is real even when its imagined object is not. My question about “where” a claim belongs does not assume that every proposed entity has spatial coordinates; the type of existence being asserted must be made clear.

Source location: Engine Chapter 2, ERP; EG Chapters 2–5.Epistemic Refutation Paradox · The Existential Ground

Standard 3Existentialism

Lookup: Authenticity · Existential philosophy

Standard definition. Existentialism is a family of philosophical approaches centered on individual existence, freedom, responsibility, meaning, authenticity, and the problem of living under conditions that do not automatically supply a pre-written purpose. It is not one single doctrine, but a cluster of related themes and arguments. [S3]

In my work. I do not treat existentialism as a replacement for logic. I treat it as a real diagnostic: it correctly notices the pressure points (meaning, finitude, responsibility) that any complete worldview must account for.

That does not make every existentialist account of freedom identical to my caused-agency account. Shared questions do not remove substantive differences in the answers.

Source location: EG Chapters 1, 16 and 18.Meaning, Love, and Purpose

Standard 4Logicism

Lookup: Mathematical logicism · Neologicism (related)

Standard definition. Logicism is a view in the philosophy of mathematics that aims to ground mathematics in logic, usually by showing that mathematical truths can be derived from logical principles (or are, in an important sense, logical). [S4]

In my work. I use the word “logicism” more broadly as a posture claim: I try to keep the rules explicit, avoid hidden assumptions, and force my own system to state failure conditions.

The title Existential Logicism does not claim that my work is simply the mathematical logicist program. The shared word has a declared broader use here.

Source location: Engine Chapter 1; the site’s stated usage.Epistemic Refutation Paradox

Standard 5Ontology

Lookup: Ontological commitment · Categories of being

Standard definition. Ontology is the part of metaphysics concerned with what exists and what kinds of things exist, including categories of being and how different kinds of entities relate. [S5]

In my work. When I say ontology, I usually mean “what the system commits to as real.” I treat ontology as a ledger: you do not get to assume entities and then deny their costs.

Source location: EG Chapters 2, 4 and 19.Explanatory Cartography

Standard 6Epistemology

Lookup: Theory of knowledge · Epistemic warrant

Standard definition. Epistemology is the study of knowledge: what knowledge is, how it is justified, what counts as evidence, and what the limits of knowing are. [S6]

In my work. This is why skepticism and interpretation appear so often in my work. Any framework that refuses epistemology eventually smuggles it in unconsciously.

I develop a constructive account of shared knowledge through comparison, prediction, causal resistance, and correction. The limits of finite access do not reduce every claim to an unsupported opinion.

Source location: Engine Chapter 2; EG Chapters 3 and 19.Tripp’s Prison

Standard 7Metaphysics

Lookup: General account of reality

Standard definition. Metaphysics studies the most general features of reality, including being, identity, time, modality (possibility and necessity), causation, and the relation between mind and world. [S7]

In my work. I treat metaphysics as unavoidable. If you do not declare a metaphysic, you inherit one.

Source location: EG Chapters 1–2 and 19.Explanatory Cartography

Standard 8Causal determinism (Determinism)

Lookup: Determinism · Unique continuation · Predictability (contrast)

Standard definition. Causal determinism is the thesis that events are fixed by prior conditions together with the laws of nature, such that given the same prior state and laws, only one future is physically possible. [S8]

In my work. I treat determinism as a question of model discipline: is the story specifying enough structure that outcomes follow, or is it hiding randomness and calling it explanation.

A determinate state or a causal relation alone does not prove a unique successor. PPD’s source-sufficiency condition must remain explicit. Limited prediction is also distinct from indeterminism, and caused deliberation remains part of what changes the outcome.

Source location: Engine §5.12, PPD; EG Chapters 11 and 16.Persistent Present Determinism · Caused Agency and Responsibility

Standard 9Causation

Lookup: Cause and effect · Causal dependence

Standard definition. Causation is the relation (or family of relations) between causes and effects. Philosophical debates ask what causation is, whether it is fundamental or emergent, and how it is represented in science and explanation. [S9]

In my work. I treat causation as a constraint: if the system breaks causal order without explicitly accounting for that break, the system collapses into narrative.

An account of causal resolution must show how the relevant conditions constrain a transition. Causation is not an extra source of energy that can repair a missing physical account by being named.

Source location: Engine Chapters 4–5; EG Chapters 11–12.Causal Resolution and the Dynamic Ground

Standard 10Relativity (Einstein’s relativity)

Lookup: Einstein’s relativity · Relativistic theory

Standard definition. Relativity refers to Einstein’s theories describing space and time (special relativity) and gravitation as spacetime geometry (general relativity). These theories revise classical notions of absolute time and instantaneous influence. [S10]

In my work. I treat relativity as an extremely powerful overlay language for reporting measurements. My deeper question is what that reporting language is summarizing underneath.

That is my interpretive question, not Einstein’s definition of his theories. A proposed underlying carrier must earn its own physical support; criticizing an ontology does not replace the tested relations among measurements.

Source location: Engine §5.4; EG Chapters 8, 13 and 19.Carrier and Readout

Standard 11Special relativity

Lookup: SR · Inertial frames · Time dilation

Standard definition. Special relativity describes physics in inertial frames, including the constancy of the speed of light in vacuum and effects such as time dilation and length contraction as consequences of spacetime structure. [S10]

In my work. When I mention special relativity, I usually mean rate-of-change comparisons between systems in motion, not time as a “substance.”

The standard theory is not defined as a claim that time is a material substance. I separate its physical relations from the additional ontological picture a reader may attach to them.

Source location: Engine §5.4; EG Chapter 8.Persistent Present Determinism · Carrier and Readout

Standard 12General relativity

Lookup: GR · Gravitation · Spacetime curvature

Standard definition. General relativity extends relativity to gravitation, describing gravity as curvature of spacetime associated with mass-energy, and predicting phenomena such as gravitational time dilation, light deflection, and black hole horizons. [S11]

In my work. I treat it as the best legacy mapping we have for gravity readouts. I do not treat it as a license to tolerate infinities without audit.

Here “readout” identifies my use of the theory in the carrier/readout distinction. It is not a standard proof that the geometry has no physical significance, nor an empirical validation of RSI merely because RSI is designed to respect a logical constraint.

Source location: EG Chapters 8, 13 and 19.Carrier and Readout

Standard 13Speed of light (c)

Lookup: c · Vacuum light speed · 299,792,458 m/s

Standard definition. The speed of light in vacuum, c, is a defined physical constant: 299,792,458 meters per second (exact, by definition in SI units). [S12]

In my work. When I refer to “the speed limit,” I am referring to propagation constraints in physical signaling and causal influence, not a metaphysical ban on imagination.

The symbol c here names the vacuum light speed. It is not the structural coupling descriptor c(S) used in the Engine’s separate discussion of experiential profiles.

Source location: EG Chapters 8 and 13; standard SI constant.Carrier and Readout

Standard 14Mass-energy equivalence (E = mc²)

Lookup: E = mc² · E₀ = mc² · Rest energy

Standard definition. The rest energy of a system with mass m is E₀ = mc², where c is the vacuum light speed. This is the rest-frame form of mass–energy equivalence. The familiar E = mc² is shorthand in that setting, not the complete expression for every system’s total energy in every frame. [S13]

In my work. When I mention E = mc², I treat it as a mapping rule between descriptions, not as a permission slip to ignore accounting discipline.

The displayed relation concerns rest energy for a system of mass m. It does not say that every energy calculation is complete without identifying motion, the system being measured, and the relevant conservation account.

Source location: EG Chapter 12; Einstein, Relativity §15.Energy, Work, and Physical Accounting

Standard 15Black hole

Lookup: Event horizon · Black-hole horizon · Singularity (contrast)

Standard definition. In the classical relativistic description, a region separated by an event horizon from which outward light signals cannot reach the distant exterior. Observations concern the effects on surrounding matter, radiation, and the spacetime environment rather than direct light from the interior. [S14]

In my work. When I discuss black holes, I focus on the horizon as an observational boundary. I do not assume “singularity” as a free pass for contradictions.

A horizon and a singularity are distinct notions. Recognizing the observational boundary does not by itself determine the ultimate interior structure or authorize replacing a physical model with a label.

Source location: EG Chapters 8 and 13; standard black-hole terminology.Carrier and Readout

Standard 16Wormhole

Lookup: Traversable wormhole · Spacetime throat

Standard definition. A wormhole is a hypothetical spacetime structure appearing as a solution class in general relativity, often described as a tunnel-like connection between separate regions of spacetime. Whether physically realizable wormholes exist is unknown. [S15]

In my work. When I discuss wormholes, I treat them as claims about stable channels and admissible structure, not as a default sci-fi travel device.

A mathematical solution is not an observation of a traversable object. The conditions needed to create, maintain, and traverse the channel have to be established; a suggestive diagram supplies none of those conditions.

Source location: EG Chapter 8; Morris and Thorne (1988).Persistent Present Determinism

Standard 17Chronology protection conjecture (Hawking)

Lookup: Chronology protection · Closed timelike curves · CTCs · Time travel to the past

Standard definition. The chronology protection conjecture is the idea that the laws of physics prevent macroscopic closed timelike curves and “time travel to the past,” even if some mathematical solutions in general relativity appear to allow such structures. [S16]

In my work. I treat chronology protection as a serious constraint on what a coherent universe can permit without breaking causal order.

It remains identified here as Hawking’s conjecture, not a proved general theorem or another name for PPD. My argument about temporal ontology has its own premises and cannot borrow the status of a settled physical result from this proposal.

Source location: EG Chapter 8; Hawking (1992).Persistent Present Determinism

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Sources and reading

The references below identify established definitions, named theories, and tradition-specific usages. They do not thereby endorse my conclusions. The book locations identify my own arguments and the conditions that govern them. A source describing a position is not evidence that the position has been proved.

The publication links open the book pages. Chapter and section locators identify passages within the named works; they do not claim that a link opens an exact PDF page or that every edition has identical pagination.

Existential Logicism: Engine

Matthew Tripp Zejda, Existential Logicism: A Logic-Based Engine for Navigating Reality. Chapter 2 develops ERP and Tripp’s Prison; Chapter 5 develops PPD. Chapter 6 and §6.5 distinguish the spectrum of structural profiles from the evidentiary-parity argument. Chapter 7 and §7.10 develop the constitutive account of moral force. Chapter 8, especially §§8.4 and 8.12, separates causal behavior, internal ought, and the practical standard of reducing suffering. Open the Engine publication page.

Existential Logicism: Tool

Matthew Tripp Zejda, Existential Logicism: A Logic-Based Tool for Navigating Reality. The prose treatment follows the same connected questions. Formal section numbers on this page refer to the Engine rather than implying that the Tool contains the same formal apparatus. Open the Tool publication page.

Finite Mind, Finite God

Matthew Zejda, Finite Mind, Finite God. Chapters 1–2 address finite access and revelation; Chapters 3–4, access, capacity, and belief gates; Chapters 5–8, translation, predication, personhood, and ultimacy; Chapter 9, institutions and control overlays. Chapter 11 identifies standard, specialized, and system vocabulary. The label [FMFG] points here where the source supplies the local term or its specialized use. Open the FMFG publication page.

Existential Ground

Matthew Tripp Zejda, Existential Ground: The Undeniable Foundation Beneath Reality, Time, God, and Life. Chapters 1–4 establish the common questions, ground, occurrence, finite access, and representation. Chapters 8–13 address time, continuation, dynamics, energy, and the proposed physical bridge. Chapters 14–18 develop mind, ultimacy, agency, fear, and finite meaning. Chapter 19 and Appendices A–D preserve the argument, terminology, scope, and explanatory connections. Open the Existential Ground publication page.

RSI and the physical interpretation

My carrier/readout interpretation is explained in Existential Ground, Chapters 12–13 and 19, alongside the RSI physical program. It is distinct from the standard meanings documented by Einstein, NIST, and the physical sources below. A logical constraint is not by itself a physical validation. Open the Introduction to Universal Relativity publication page.

Main-sequence references

Labels M1–M42 serve entries 218–313. Original papers and primary texts are identified by author; encyclopedia entries document established distinctions and the positions under discussion.

[M1] Ned Block, “On a confusion about a function of consciousness” (1995). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18(2), 227–247. Phenomenal and access consciousness.
[M2] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Qualia. The entry’s opening distinctions and account of the named position.
[M3] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Intentionality. The entry’s opening distinctions and account of the named position.
[M4] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Functionalism. The entry’s opening distinctions and account of the named position.
[M5] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Behaviorism. The entry’s opening distinctions and account of the named position.
[M6] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Physicalism. The entry’s opening distinctions and account of the named position.
[M7] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Dualism. The entry’s opening distinctions and account of the named position.
[M8] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Zombies. The entry’s opening distinctions and account of the named position.
[M9] John R. Searle, “Minds, brains, and programs” (1980). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3(3), 417–424. The argument concerning program instantiation and intentionality.
[M10] Alan M. Turing, “Computing machinery and intelligence” (1950). Mind 59(236), 433–460. The imitation-game proposal; original offprint held by King’s College, Cambridge.
[M11] Larissa Albantakis and colleagues, “Integrated information theory (IIT) 4.0” (2023). PLOS Computational Biology 19(10), e1011465. The formulation-specific relation between physical cause–effect structure and phenomenal existence.
[M12] Christof Koch, Marcello Massimini, Melanie Boly and Giulio Tononi, “Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems” (2016). Nature Reviews Neuroscience 17, 307–321. Definition of the NCC; content, enabling conditions and report-related processes.
[M13] David Premack and Guy Woodruff, “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?” (1978). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1(4), 515–526. Mental-state attribution; the definition does not by itself settle another being’s phenomenology.
[M14] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Emergent Properties. Introduction and the distinctions among the positions discussed.
[M15] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Metaethics. Introduction and the distinctions among the positions discussed.
[M16] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Moral Realism. Introduction and the distinctions among the positions discussed.
[M17] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Moral Anti-Realism. Introduction and the distinctions among the positions discussed.
[M18] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Moral Relativism. Introduction and the distinctions among the positions discussed.
[M19] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism. Introduction and the distinctions among the positions discussed.
[M20] David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 3.1.1.27. The transition from descriptive statements to ought-statements; SBN 469–470.
[M21] G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (1903), §10. The difference between identifying what is good and purporting to define goodness.
[M22] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Consequentialism. The named theory and its scope; distinct aims of appraisal and response are not interchangeable.
[M23] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Deontological Ethics. The named theory and its scope; distinct aims of appraisal and response are not interchangeable.
[M24] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Kant’s Moral Philosophy. The named theory and its scope; distinct aims of appraisal and response are not interchangeable.
[M25] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Virtue Ethics. The named theory and its scope; distinct aims of appraisal and response are not interchangeable.
[M26] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Moral Responsibility. The named theory and its scope; distinct aims of appraisal and response are not interchangeable.
[M27] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Retributive Justice. The named theory and its scope; distinct aims of appraisal and response are not interchangeable.
[M28] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Legal Punishment. The named theory and its scope; distinct aims of appraisal and response are not interchangeable.
[M29] Matthew 7:12, with the USCCB note on the Golden Rule. A particular scriptural formulation and the accompanying note on earlier and later forms of reciprocity.
[M30] John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859), Chapter I. Mill’s stated principle governing coercive interference. This citation identifies his position, not a present-day policy recommendation.
[M31] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Well-Being. Accounts of what makes a life go well, including the role of pleasure and suffering.
[M32] Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape (2010). The author’s book page identifies the well-being landscape and his argument about science and value.
[M33] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Philosophy of Religion. The relevant concept, its definitions and the distinctions retained in this reference.
[M34] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Atheism and Agnosticism. The relevant concept, its definitions and the distinctions retained in this reference.
[M35] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Pantheism. The relevant concept, its definitions and the distinctions retained in this reference.
[M36] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Panentheism. The relevant concept, its definitions and the distinctions retained in this reference.
[M37] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Omnipotence. The relevant concept, its definitions and the distinctions retained in this reference.
[M38] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Omniscience. The relevant concept, its definitions and the distinctions retained in this reference.
[M39] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Divine Simplicity. The relevant concept, its definitions and the distinctions retained in this reference.
[M40] Catechism of the Catholic Church, §§253–255. Unity, distinction and relation in the Catholic statement of the Trinity.
[M41] Catechism of the Catholic Church, §§66–67. Completion of public revelation distinguished from later private revelations and interpretation.
[M42] Catechism of the Catholic Church, §§846–848. The no-fault ignorance qualification and its surrounding soteriological conditions.

Standard-definition references

Labels S1–S16 serve the separately numbered Standard 1–17 entries. A shared source can support more than one related definition. These sources establish the ordinary usage, not my additional interpretation.

[S1] Merriam-Webster: Existential. Existence-related and existentialist uses of the adjective.
[S2] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Existence. Introduction and the analysis of existential assertions.
[S3] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Existentialism. The family of approaches and its principal questions.
[S4] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Logicism and Neologicism. The philosophy-of-mathematics meaning, distinct from the declared broader site usage.
[S5] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Metaphysics. The account of ontology and questions concerning being.
[S6] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Epistemology. Knowledge, justification and epistemic questions.
[S7] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Metaphysics. The general field, including identity, modality, time and causation.
[S8] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Causal Determinism. The state-and-laws formulation; determination distinguished from predictability.
[S9] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Counterfactual Theories of Causation. One major family of causal analysis, not a claim that all theories reduce to it.
[S10] Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and General Theory, Part I. Robert W. Lawson translation; the linked revised edition. Special relativity, inertial frames, light and measurement.
[S11] Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and General Theory, Part II. The general theory and gravitation. The black-hole entry has its separate source.
[S12] NIST: Speed of light in vacuum. Exact SI value, 299,792,458 m/s.
[S13] Albert Einstein, Relativity: The Special and General Theory, §15. General results of the special theory, including the relation of mass and energy.
[S14] NASA Science: Anatomy of a Black Hole. Event horizon, observational evidence and the separate question of a singularity.
[S15] Michael S. Morris and Kip S. Thorne, “Wormholes in spacetime and their use for interstellar travel” (1988). American Journal of Physics 56, 395–412. Original article abstract and bibliographic record; conditions for proposed traversable solutions.
[S16] Stephen W. Hawking, “Chronology protection conjecture” (1992). Physical Review D 46, 603–611. A physical conjecture and its supporting arguments, not a general proof.

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Mind, consciousness, and cognitive science

Ethics, value, and responsibility

Religion, theology, and interpretation

Institutions, authority, and transmission

Standard definitions and my usage

Sources and reading

Existential Logicism: Engine

Existential Logicism: Tool

Finite Mind, Finite God

Existential Ground

RSI and the physical interpretation

Main-sequence references

Standard-definition references

Related terminology