The Bad Frame, Finite Mind, Finite God: Core Thesis (FMFG)

Finite Mind, Finite God names the claim that the standard “God exists / God does not exist” debate is a bad frame: it treats “God” like an ordinary object-claim, when the concept is usually meant to name ultimacy, and any claim that matters to a finite mind must pass through a finite experiential interface—so there is no epistemic bypass, and “God” cannot function as a brute external stopper without collapsing into something else.

Book: Finite Mind, Finite God (2026). Location in text: Chapter 1 (“The God Debate Is a Bad Frame,” including the opening theorem sequence and the conditions for a “God”-claim to succeed), the closing synthesis “Beyond the God/no-God frame,” and Appendix 11 (“Terminology, Notation, and Conventions”).

WHAT IT IS

Finite Mind, Finite God begins with a simple diagnosis: the modern debate about religion is usually staged as a binary choice between theism and atheism, as if both sides are answering a well-formed, object-level question. The frame assumes that “God exists” and “God does not exist” are meaningful claims in the same way “Planets exist” or “Atoms exist” are meaningful claims, and it assumes that “God” functions like a stable referent inside a shared language-game. FMFG argues that this is the root of why the debate persists, recycles, and fails to resolve: the debate is often not a clash over evidence inside a stable category, but a clash over whether the category is coherent under the conditions that make any claim meaningful for finite minds.

The book’s core move is to treat finitude as a structural constraint rather than a psychological mood. A finite mind is not merely a mind with limited information; it is a mind with bounded cognitive resources. It can only operate by way of an experiential interface, the total space of what can be tokened as experience, memory, inference, imagination, and representation. In the book’s notation, the mind M has an interface I(M), and whatever “God” is taken to be for that mind appears, if it appears at all, as a tokened God-concept inside that interface. That means the operative “God” in lived religion is never a frame-free entity accessed from outside cognition; it is a representational object inside a finite interface, subject to the same constraints as every other claim.

That finitude constraint forces a shift in what counts as a successful “God”-claim. FMFG proposes conditions that any meaningful God-claim must satisfy if it is going to function as more than poetry or social signaling: it must designate a coherent target rather than a sliding metaphor; it must allow intersubjective traction rather than being definitionally private; it must avoid functioning as a brute explanatory stopper; and it must remain compatible with the constraints that Existential Logicism places on meaningfulness, including the elimination of empty “nothingness” postures and the rejection of incoherent infinite-regress explanations. The result is not “atheism by shortcut.” The result is a methodological filter: many traditional God-claims fail not because they are false in a straightforward empirical sense, but because they fail to pick out a stable kind of thing that finite minds can meaningfully assert, deny, or evaluate.

This is why the title is not rhetorical. “Finite Mind, Finite God” does not mean “God is literally finite” as a metaphysical proclamation. It means that whatever functions for finite minds under the label “God” is, in practice, a finite model—an interface-bound construct that cannot bypass the conditions of finite cognition by mere stipulation. When people try to escape that by refining “God” upward into “pure ultimacy,” FMFG argues that the concept often collapses into existence itself, becoming indistinguishable from the existential ground: the non-optional fact that something obtains. When people try to keep “God” as an agent with will, intention, and authority, the operative result tends to be a finite-god trap: a finite representation or institution is treated as ultimate, and the proxy becomes the thing it proxies. The thesis is therefore a reframing: the deepest conflict is not between “God” and “no God,” but between honest finitude and the temptation to treat a finite model as infinity.

WHY IT MATTERS

Finite Mind, Finite God matters because it changes the moral and intellectual stakes of religious disagreement. If the God/no-God frame is broken, then many accusations that fuel cultural conflict lose their footing. The believer is not automatically irrational for having a doorway-model of ultimacy, and the nonbeliever is not automatically morally deficient for refusing to call an interface-bound proxy “ultimate.” Both are finite minds inside the same existential ground. The difference is not who “has reality.” The difference is whether a finite model is treated as a doorway into reality, or as a wall placed in front of it.

It matters because it blocks the epistemic loophole that theology often tries to use. If there is no epistemic bypass around the human interface, then appeals to revelation, scripture, tradition, or sacred authority do not magically exit the constraints of cognition. They still arrive as tokened contents inside finite minds, mediated by language, institutions, memory, power, and interpretation. That does not refute them. It simply removes their attempt to function as a frame-free trump card. Claims about ultimacy have to be assessed inside the same arena as every other claim: coherence, traction, consequences, and compatibility with what cannot be denied.

It matters because it clarifies what is left standing after the collapse. FMFG’s central threat to religious absolutism is not nihilism; it is the refusal to trade the open territory of reality for a manageable portrait and then call the portrait “ultimate.” When the God category fails to survive the constraints required for meaningful assertion, what remains is not emptiness. What remains is the world: existence, finite minds, moral reality as lived consequence, and the demand for intellectual honesty.

It matters because it sets the stage for the book’s downstream results. Once the God/no-God binary is dismantled as a bad frame, you can ask better questions: What does moral responsibility track when belief is not a switch you freely flip? How do translation layers turn into control overlays? What does salvation mean once exclusivist gating is exposed as conceptually unstable under fairness constraints? Those later results depend on the core thesis, because the core thesis removes the false starting point that makes every later problem look like a simple battle between “faith” and “skepticism.”

FORMAL SPINE

Finite Mind, Finite God has a formal backbone that mirrors the Existential Logicism habit of turning “common sense discomfort” into explicit constraints.

Definition 1.3 (Finite Mind and Experiential Interface) introduces the key formal limitation: a finite mind M has an experiential interface I(M), the bounded domain of tokenable representational states. Whatever functions in reasoning for M must be tokenable in I(M). Any candidate God-concept for M therefore appears as a tokened representational object, sometimes notated as G_M, inside the interface.

Glossary entry (God/no-God frame) names the target of the critique: the default modern staging of the religious question as a binary between theism and atheism, treated as rival answers to an object-level question. FMFG argues this frame smuggles in exactly what it needs to justify: that “God” is a stable, shared referent with ordinary claim-conditions.

Glossary entry (Finite Mind Constraint) states the governing rule: any meaningful claim must be expressible within a finite interface and cannot bypass perspectival limitation by pure stipulation. This is the book’s anti-cheat clause. If the only way a claim survives is by declaring itself immune to interface constraints, then it is not functioning as a meaningful claim for finite minds.

Chapter 1 (Conditions for a successful “God”-claim) sharpens the constraint into criteria. A God-claim must designate a coherent target, permit intersubjective traction, avoid brute-stopper function, and remain compatible with the constraints imported from Existential Logicism (including the rejection of incoherent regress moves and empty “nothingness” postures). This step is crucial because it prevents the debate from becoming a mere exchange of preferences. It forces “God” talk to meet the same minimum intelligibility standards as any other serious claim.

Glossary entry (Collapse proof) names the proof-pattern that follows: if a contested category cannot survive the constraints required for meaningful assertion by finite minds, then the category collapses into other already-available categories. In FMFG, the contested category is the “God” category as typically deployed in the God/no-God frame.

Glossary entry (Existential Ground) specifies what remains after the collapse: the non-optional fact of existence, the shared floor of whatever obtains. This is not “God” as an object among objects. It is the minimal ontological remainder that is still there once incoherent object-level God-claims fail to name a stable kind.

Glossary entry (Human Interface Thesis) generalizes the argument across all religious epistemology: there is no epistemic bypass around the human interface. Revelation, scripture, tradition, and doctrine may be meaningful, but they are still interface-delivered. They therefore cannot serve as external courts that overrule the finite mind constraint.

Glossary entry (Ultimacy and Totality) captures a decisive fork. When “God” is treated as a personal agent with superlative properties, the concept drifts toward finite proxies and the finite-god trap. When “God” is refined toward ultimacy identified with totality, the concept tends to collapse into existence itself, producing a nondual-style result where “God” becomes indistinguishable from the existential ground. FMFG treats these as not rhetorical outcomes, but as structural consequences of attempting to make “God” do coherent work under finite interface constraints.

HOW IT WORKS

Start with finitude as a hard boundary: finite minds can only reason by tokening representational states inside a finite experiential interface I(M). Whatever “God” is for a human being, it must appear for that human being inside that interface.

Treat the God/no-God debate as a claim about claim-conditions. The issue is not merely whether the world contains an entity that satisfies some description; the issue is whether the term “God,” as deployed in the binary frame, successfully designates a coherent target that finite minds can meaningfully assert, deny, and evaluate.

Impose the finite mind constraint. If a “God” claim is saved only by stipulating that it is beyond all interface conditions while still making demands on belief, morality, or authority inside the interface, the claim is trying to be both operative and exempt. FMFG’s constraint refuses that hybrid: if it functions, it is interface-bound; if it is not interface-bound, it does not function as a claim for finite minds.

Apply the Chapter 1 criteria. Ask whether the concept designates a coherent target, yields intersubjective traction, avoids brute-stopper use, and remains compatible with the broader Existential Logicism constraints. Where the concept fails, it does not fail as an empirical hypothesis; it fails as a stable category.

Follow the collapse. When “God” is treated as an ordinary object-claim, it tends to fragment across incompatible definitions and lose traction. When it is refined toward genuine ultimacy to escape fragmentation, it tends to collapse into existential ground. When it is preserved as a willful authority to preserve religious structure, it tends to reappear as finite proxies and institutions treated as ultimate.

End at the reversal. The point is not to subtract meaning. The point is to remove blinders: to stop trading the open territory of reality for a finite portrait and then demanding devotion to the portrait. FMFG replaces the false comfort of a proxy-infinity with the seriousness of reality-as-large-as-it-is, plus the ethical demand to build meaning without pretending that an interface-bound model is the thing it models.

COMMON OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES

Objection: “So you’re just an atheist with extra steps.”
Reply: FMFG is not a vote for atheism. It is a diagnosis of a framing error. The book argues that the God/no-God binary presupposes a stable category that often fails the criteria for meaningful assertion under finite mind constraints. That critique applies to careless theism and careless atheism alike, because both positions can inherit the broken category.

Objection: “You’re defining God into existence by calling existence ‘the existential ground.’”
Reply: The existential ground is not introduced as a trick definition. It is introduced as what remains when incoherent object-level claims collapse. FMFG’s point is that when “God” is refined toward genuine ultimacy, the refined content often becomes indistinguishable from the non-optional fact that something obtains. That is not “winning by definition.” It is naming the remainder that cannot be erased by category failure.

Objection: “If God is beyond human understanding, your criteria don’t apply.”
Reply: If “beyond understanding” means “beyond the interface,” then the claim cannot do the work people ask it to do inside life: it cannot ground obligations, authorize institutions, or resolve disputes. The Human Interface Thesis is explicit: there is no epistemic bypass around the human interface. Any claim that functions for humans does so as an interface-token, and therefore it is subject to coherence and traction constraints.

Objection: “This reduces religion to psychology or sociology.”
Reply: FMFG does not deny psychological and sociological dynamics; it distinguishes functions. The book treats religions as translation layers that can preserve insight and as control overlays that can enforce power. That distinction is not a reduction; it is a clarification of mechanisms. The core thesis remains logical: interface constraints govern what can count as a meaningful claim for finite minds.

Objection: “You’re attacking a simplistic, modern version of God.”
Reply: FMFG’s target is the modern staging of the religious question as a binary object-level dispute. The critique applies precisely because sophisticated theology often already tries to escape the object-level trap by moving toward ultimacy, analogy, apophatic restraint, or nondual formulations. FMFG reads those moves as evidence that the ordinary object-category is unstable, and it follows the consequences of trying to make the concept coherent under finite mind constraints.

HOW TO USE IT IN DEBATE

Move Card: Break the frame
Claim: The God/no-God binary treats “God” as an ordinary object-claim, but the concept is usually meant to name ultimacy, and FMFG argues the frame is broken.
If they say: “Either God exists or not, it’s simple.”
You respond: Simple is not the same as well-formed. Before you can assert or deny, you have to show the term designates a coherent target with shared claim-conditions. FMFG’s first move is to test whether the category survives the finite mind constraint.

Move Card: Block the epistemic bypass
Claim: There is no epistemic bypass around the human interface. Any revelation or authority still enters life as an interface-token.
If they say: “Scripture settles it.”
You respond: Scripture may be meaningful, but it is still mediated through language, interpretation, institutions, and finite cognition. It cannot function as a frame-free court that exempts itself from coherence and traction demands.

Move Card: Neutralize brute-stopper theology
Claim: A “God” concept that functions as a brute explanatory stopper fails the conditions for a successful claim.
If they say: “God is the ultimate explanation, end of story.”
You respond: An explanation that stops because you declare it ultimate is not explanatory traction; it is a terminator label. FMFG requires that ultimacy claims remain compatible with non-regress constraints without becoming mere stop-signs.

Move Card: Reframe the moral insult
Claim: Believers are not fools and nonbelievers are not morally deficient; both are finite minds inside the same existential ground.
If they say: “Atheists just hate God,” or “Believers are delusional.”
You respond: FMFG shifts the dispute from insult to structure. The core difference is whether a finite model is treated as a doorway into reality or as a wall that blocks the territory behind it.

Move Card: Offer the “doorway vs wall” test
Claim: Finite models are inevitable; the key is whether you treat the model as a proxy for reality or confuse the proxy with the ultimate.
If they say: “My doctrine is ultimate truth.”
You respond: FMFG asks whether your “ultimate” doctrine still behaves like a finite portrait—bounded, contested, mediated, and institutionally shaped. If so, treating it as infinity is the finite-god trap.

CONNECTIONS TO OTHER PAGES

Connects backward to: Tripp’s Prison (epistemic frame closure), because FMFG relies on the same “no view from nowhere” pressure applied to theology.

Connects backward to: Illusion of Nothingness and Logical Elimination of Infinite Regress, because FMFG requires that ultimacy claims avoid empty-null postures and avoid regress-breaking by brute stipulation.

Connects forward to: Human Interface Thesis, because the “no bypass” result becomes the bridge from metaphysical debate to religious authority, scripture, and institutional power.

Connects forward to: Existential Ground, because the collapse of the object-level God category leaves a non-optional remainder that functions as a common reference-point for finite minds.

Connects forward to: Religion as Translation and Control Overlays, because once “God” is not allowed to function as a frame-free authority, religions can be analyzed by their translation function versus their coercive overlay function.

TERMINOLOGY INDEX FOR THIS PAGE

Finite Mind (M)
Experiential Interface (I(M))
God-concept tokening (G_M)
God/no-God frame
Finite Mind Constraint
Human Interface Thesis
Collapse proof
Existential Ground
Ultimacy (U)
Totality