The Omnibenevolence Misappraisal Theorem (OMT)

1. Omnibenevolence Misappraisal Theorem

Standalone concept theorem note (EL + FMFG application)

1.1 What this node is doing

When a finite agent says “God is good” or “God is bad,” the agent is not speaking from a view outside the interface. The agent is reporting a conclusion formed inside a tokened cognitive pipeline: language, testimony, culture, translation, interpretation, memory, affect, and the agent’s own limits. Whatever “God” is upstream, the downstream object an agent can actually appraise is the received God-map.

At the same time, many theological systems treat “God is good” as an objective claim, not a preference claim. In that posture, “God is bad” cannot be a correct perspective. If a correct perspective existed that implied God is unjust, then God would not be objectively all-good.

This note formalizes that constraint and then applies the Fairness Clause. The result is a stable rule: if a tradition wants to keep omnibenevolence and also claim its condemnation is just, then negative God-appraisal cannot be treated as culpable by default. It must be treated as misappraisal under finitude and mediation unless the system can establish access, capacity, and control for the demanded appraisal.

1.2 Imported concepts (refs)

This note uses the standard EL/FMFG concept pages as imports. It does not re-prove them here.

Finite Mind Tokening Constraint
Human Interface Thesis
Doxastic Constraint (belief and appraisal are not unconditional will-switches)
Fairness Clause (culpability is constrained by access, capacity, control)

1.3 Terms and notation used locally

Definition 1.1 (Agent, system, God-term).
Let $A$ range over finite epistemic agents. Let $T$ denote a theological moral system (doctrine-set plus judgment scheme). Let $G$ denote “God” as asserted by $T$.

Definition 1.2 (Tokened God-map).
Let $G_A$ denote the tokened God-concept as it exists for agent $A$ inside $A$’s interface. When $A$ appraises “God,” the appraisal is made over $G_A$ as received.

Definition 1.3 (Moral predicates).
$Good(x)$ means “$x$ is morally good.”
$Bad(x)$ means “$x$ is morally bad or unjust.”

Definition 1.4 (Belief operator).
$B_A(p)$ means “agent $A$ believes proposition $p$.”

Definition 1.5 (Objective omnibenevolence claim).
Define
[
OG(G);:=;Good(G)\wedge \neg Bad(G).
]
“Objective” here means: not merely “good-to-me,” but good in the authoritative system-governing sense invoked to ground worship-worthiness, obedience, or condemnation.

Definition 1.6 (God-appraisal requirement).
Let $\varphi_G$ be a requirement of the form “Affirm $OG(G)$” or “Do not judge God as $Bad$ or unjust” or “Regard God as morally perfect/worthy of worship.”
Let $Req_T(\varphi_G)$ mean that $T$ imposes this requirement.

Definition 1.7 (Condemnation and culpability predicates).
$Cond_T(A,\varphi_G)$ means “$T$ condemns $A$ for violating $\varphi_G$.”
$Culp_T(A,\varphi_G)$ means “$A$ is blameworthy under $T$ for violating $\varphi_G$.”

Definition 1.8 (Negative God-appraisal).
Define
[
Neg(A,G);:=;B_A!\bigl(Bad(G)\bigr),
]
and allow $Neg(A,G)$ to cover any doxastic appraisal incompatible with $OG(G)$ (for example “God is cruel,” “God is unjust,” “God is not morally good”).

Definition 1.9 (Fairness variables).
$Acc(A,\varphi_G)$ means $A$ has adequate epistemic access relevant to $\varphi_G$ (not merely exposure, but access in a form $A$ could realistically encounter, understand, and evaluate).
$Cap(A,\varphi_G)$ means $A$ has adequate capacity relevant to $\varphi_G$ (cognitive, affective, developmental, normative).
$Ctrl(A,\varphi_G)$ means the relevant state is under enough control to be a proper target of blame (in particular belief and appraisal are not treated as unconditional at-will switches).

1.4 Core lemmas

Lemma 1.10 (Interface-bounded appraisal).
For any finite agent $A$, any appraisal of “God” that can matter to $A$’s reasoning is an appraisal of $G_A$ as received within $A$’s interface.

Proof. By the finite mind tokening constraint, every doxastic and evaluative state available to $A$ is tokened within $A$’s interface. By the human interface thesis, public God-claims arrive to $A$ as mediated tokens (text, testimony, translation, interpretation). Therefore $A$’s appraisal is necessarily formed over the interface-available representation $G_A$. $\square$

Lemma 1.11 (Omnibenevolence excludes correct negative appraisal).
If $OG(G)$ holds, then $Bad(G)$ is false. Hence if $OG(G)$ is true, a negative appraisal “God is bad/unjust” cannot be correct as an appraisal of $G$.

Proof. Immediate from the definition $OG(G);:=;Good(G)\wedge \neg Bad(G)$. $\square$

Lemma 1.12 (Negative appraisal forces a fork).
If $Neg(A,G)$, then at least one of the following must obtain:

(a) Refutation: $\neg OG(G)$.
(b) Misappraisal under finitude: the appraisal is tracking $G_A$ (the received map) rather than $G$ (the asserted target), so the negative content is explainable by mediation, distortion, contradiction, trauma, thin access, or other pipeline constraints.
(c) Semantic retreat: the predicates “good” and “bad” are not being used in a truth-apt, univocal way when applied to $G$, so $OG(G)$ is not functioning as a determinate evaluative premise that can ground condemnation.

Proof. Assume $Neg(A,G)$. If $OG(G)$ is false, we are in (a). If $OG(G)$ is true, then by Lemma 1.11 the negative appraisal cannot be correct as an appraisal of $G$. The remaining explanation must locate the divergence in the representational situation of $A$ (map-level misappraisal under finitude) or in the semantics of applying the predicates to $G$ (non-univocal or non-truth-apt use). $\square$

Lemma 1.13 (Belief and appraisal are not blameworthy by default).
Because belief and evaluative seeming are not, in general, direct will-switches, condemnation for a belief-state or appraisal-state cannot be justified merely by pointing to the state. Additional conditions must connect the state to controllable fault.

Proof. This is the doxastic constraint. One can choose speech and behavior more directly than one can choose what seems credible or what evaluative verdict one is compelled to by the information and cognitive state one has. Therefore culpability for belief or appraisal requires further control-sensitive justification. $\square$

Lemma 1.14 (Fairness Clause schema).
If $T$ claims its condemnation is just (culpability-tracking), then for any agent $A$ and requirement $\varphi_G$,
[
Culp_T(A,\varphi_G)\Rightarrow Acc(A,\varphi_G)\wedge Cap(A,\varphi_G)\wedge Ctrl(A,\varphi_G).
]

Proof. This is the fairness clause. Blameworthiness cannot coherently be assigned under absent access, absent capacity, or absent control if the system intends justice rather than mere imposition. $\square$

1.5 Main theorem 1 (misappraisal)

Theorem 1.15 (Omnibenevolence Misappraisal Theorem).
Assume a system $T$ asserts $OG(G)$ as a truth-apt, evaluatively binding claim. Then for any finite agent $A$, if $Neg(A,G)$, the negative appraisal cannot be a correct perspective on $G$ under $T$’s own omnibenevolence claim. Therefore $Neg(A,G)$ must be treated as either:

(a) a live refutation of $OG(G)$ (so $\neg OG(G)$), or
(b) a misappraisal generated at the interface level (an appraisal of $G_A$ as received), or
(c) a semantic retreat in which the predicates “good” and “bad” are not being used in a stable truth-apt, univocal way for $G$.

In particular, if $T insists$ that $OG(G)$ is true and truth-apt, then $Neg(A,G)$ is necessarily misaligned with $T$’s own claim and cannot be defended as a correct moral perspective on $G$.

Proof. Combine Lemma 1.11 with Lemma 1.12. If $OG(G)$ holds, then $Bad(G)$ is false, so $B_A(Bad(G))$ cannot be correct as a claim about $G$. The remaining coherent locations for the negative appraisal are refutation (deny $OG(G)$), interface-level misappraisal (map-level divergence), or semantic retreat. $\square$

1.6 Main theorem 2 (fairness application)

Theorem 1.16 (Omnibenevolence Misappraisal Trilemma).
Assume a theological moral system $T$ such that:

(i) $T$ asserts $OG(G)$.
(ii) $T$ imposes a God-appraisal requirement $Req_T(\varphi_G)$.
(iii) $T$ condemns agents for violating this requirement: $Cond_T(A,\varphi_G)$.
(iv) $T$ insists this condemnation is just (culpability-tracking), so the fairness clause applies.
(v) The imported finitude and doxastic constraints hold for the agents in question.

Then for any agent $A$, if $Neg(A,G)$, at least one of the following must be true:

(a) Drop omnibenevolence: $\neg OG(G)$.
(b) Treat the case as misappraisal under constraint: at least one of $Acc(A,\varphi_G)$, $Cap(A,\varphi_G)$, or $Ctrl(A,\varphi_G)$ fails, so culpability is defeated or reduced by fairness.
(c) Drop the justice-claim: $T$ condemns anyway (treating negative appraisal as culpable by default), thereby violating the fairness clause.

In particular, if $T$ insists on both $OG(G)$ and just condemnation, then $Neg(A,G)$ cannot be treated as culpable by default.

Proof. Fix $A$ and assume $Neg(A,G)$. By Theorem 1.15, either $\neg OG(G)$ or the negative appraisal is misappraisal (map-level divergence or semantic retreat). Now consider condemnation. If $T$ treats the violation as culpable, it must be entitled to $Culp_T(A,\varphi_G)$. By Lemma 1.14, that entails $Acc(A,\varphi_G)\wedge Cap(A,\varphi_G)\wedge Ctrl(A,\varphi_G)$. Under human mediation and doxastic constraint, those conjuncts are not automatic. If any fails, culpability collapses, yielding (b). If $T$ condemns while ignoring the failure of access, capacity, or control, it abandons justice, yielding (c). If the negative appraisal is correct, then $OG(G)$ fails, yielding (a). $\square$

1.7 Corollaries and use

Corollary 1.17 (Map-territory targeting).
For finite agents, negative God-appraisals are normally appraisals of the received map $G_A$. If $T$ wants to preserve both omnibenevolence and justice, it must address the pipeline (what was received, how it was mediated, what capacities were present), not merely punish the output state.

Corollary 1.18 (No default guilt for negative appraisal).
If $T$ insists on $OG(G)$ and claims its condemnation is just, then it cannot treat negative appraisal as culpable by default. It must show $Acc(A,\varphi_G)$, $Cap(A,\varphi_G)$, and $Ctrl(A,\varphi_G)$ in the case.

Corollary 1.19 (Diagnostic triangle for the board).
The following three claims cannot all be held together:

$OG(G)$ (God is objectively all-good).
“God is bad/unjust” can be a correct appraisal of $G$.
People deserve condemnation for concluding “God is bad/unjust.”

Pick two. Not all three.

1.8 Objection module (outside logic, time, space)

Objection 1 (God is outside logic).
If “outside logic” means “not truth-apt,” then claims like $OG(G)$ cannot function as binding premises for worship, obedience, or condemnation. The doctrine becomes immune to evaluation, but it also loses the ability to ground the moral work it is being used to do.
If “outside logic” still permits truth-apt, binding doctrine, then the moment the doctrine is stated and used to judge humans, it enters finite minds as tokened content and remains subject to the fairness constraints on culpability.

Objection 2 (God is outside time).
Even if the upstream metaphysics is “outside time,” the downstream evidential object for agents is still present interface content (texts, testimony, experiences, memories, institutional claims). Culpability can only be assessed relative to what appears in that pipeline and relative to $Acc$, $Cap$, and $Ctrl$ for the relevant requirement.

Objection 3 (God is outside space).
If “outside space” is taken to mean “no spatial consequences,” then there is no public communicative footprint to bind anyone. If God communicates in a way relevant to agents, that communication is instantiated in the agent-facing world (ink, sound, bodies, brains, artifacts). That keeps the evaluation inside the interface pipeline, which is exactly where the fairness constraints apply.

*1.9 (determinacy requirement)

Lemma 1.20 (Determinacy requirement for binding doctrine).
If $T$ uses $OG(G)$ to ground worship or condemnation, then $T$ is committed to $OG(G)$ being determinately contentful for finite agents, meaning it must be tokenable enough to guide appraisal and action. If $OG(G)$ is treated as ineffable to the point of non-evaluability, then it cannot coherently function as a culpability gate.

1.10 What this note does not claim

This note is not a proof that God does not exist, nor a proof that any particular religion is false. It is a constraint on a package of commitments: objective omnibenevolence plus appraisal-gated condemnation plus a justice claim plus ordinary facts about finitude, mediation, and belief formation.

It also does not say that negative appraisal is always blameless. It denies that blame is automatic. If a tradition wants to treat negative appraisal as culpable, it inherits a heavy burden to establish robust access, capacity, and control in the relevant case.